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THE LAW OF DAMAGES AS APPLIED TO BREACH
OF PROMISE OF MARRIAGE
THEODORE W. COUSENS*
The purpose of this study is to ascertain how far the ordinary
rules of damages apply to the apparently anomalous situation of
breach of promise of marriage.
I. THE NATURE OF THE ACTION-CONTRACT OR TORT?
At the threshold we are met with the question of the nature of the
action and of the damages allowed therein. It has been said that
the action though contract in form is in substance tort' or in the
nature of tort,2 or that as to damages it is classed with tortss or is
governed by tort principles. 4 These assertions appear to rest en-
tirely upon two propositions: (i) exemplary damages are never
allowed except in actions which are in substance tort;5 (2) exemplary
damages may properly be awarded in actions for breach of promise.6
Reserving the second proposition for further consideration7 it is
sufficient at this point to show that the first is incorrect. Exemplary
damages, like damages for mental suffering,8 are not usually allowed
for breach of contract simply because a breach of contract is rarely
the sort of thing which warrants them (if ever they are warranted,
a question outside the scope of this study). Exemplary damages, in
jurisdictions which permit such damages to be awarded, may only be
given in cases where the defendant's conduct is of a particularly
*Of the Department of Government and Law, Lafayette College.
'One case goes so far as to say that where seduction appears the action is only
formally for the breach of promise to marry and is in substance for the seduction
alone. Coil v. Wallace, 24 N. J. L. 291 (1854).
'Kelley v. Highfield, I Ore. 277, 14 Pac. 744 (1887); Osmun v. Winters, 30
Ore. 177, 46 Pac. 780 (1896); Mainz v. Lederer, 24 R. I. 23, 51 At. 1o44 (1902).
3Haymond v. Saucer, 84 Ind. 3 (1882); Thorn v. Knapp, 42 N. Y. 474 (1870);
HALE, DAMAGES (2nd ed. 1912) § 167.
'Goddard v. Westcott, 82 Mich. I8o, 46 N. W. 242 (189o); 4 SUTHERLAND,
DAMAGES (4th ed. 1916) § 983. Contra: Broyhill v. Norton, 175 Mo. I9o,74S.W.
1024 (1903); Quirk v. Thomas, [i916] i K. B. 516; Smith v. Hall, 69 Conn. 651,
38 Atl. 386 (1897).
6Cumberland Telephone Co. v. Cartwright Creek Telephone Co., 128 Ky. 395,
1o8 S. W. 875 (19o8); Hoy v. Gronoble, 34 Pa. 9 (1859); Guldford v. Anglo-
French Steamship Co., 9 Can. Sup. Ct. 303 (1883).
OLuther v. Shaw, 157 Wis. 231, 147 N. W. 17 (1914); Chellis v. Chapman, 125
N. Y. 214,26 N. E. 308 (I89I); Goodall v. Thurman, i Head 209 (Tenn. 1858);
Coryell v. Colbaugh, i N. J. L. 77 (1791).
7See infra page 390. 3See infra page 383.
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outrageous character. 9 Thus exemplary damages are permissible
in contract cases where fraud" or oppression1 ' appears, or where the
breach of contract displays wanton and reckless disregard of the plain-
tiff's rights.12
a. The General Principle of Contract Damages
That the action for breach of promise and its damages are contract
in nature and not tort is, furthermore, evidenced by the application
to it of several of the distinctive rules of contract damages. Thus the
general principle of contract damages is that the injured party
should, as nearly as possible, be placed in the same position as he
would have been if the contract had been performed.13 From this it
follows that he cannot recover for anything of which he would equally
have been deprived had the contract been performed, such as the
consideration for the contract 4 or the amounts expended or ad-
vantages given up in preparation for performance.'5 This rule is
applied to breach of promise.16
b. Causation
Another distinctive rule of contract damages which is applied to
breach of promise is that the losses recovered for must be caused, 7
and proximately caused, 8 by breach of the terms of the contract.
*E. g. conduct in defiance of plaintiff's constitutional rights, Scott v. Donald
165 U. S. 58, 17 Sup. Ct. 265 (1896); conduct extremely violent and insulting
toward the plaintiff, Goddard v. Grand Trunk Railway, 57 Me. 202 (1869);
negligent conduct in reckless disregard of observable danger to the plaintiff or to
his property, Emblen v. Myers, 6 H. & N. 54 (i85o).
"cRose v. Beattie, 2 Nott & McCord 538 (S. C. 1820).
"Knoxville Traction Co. v. Lane, io3 Tenn. 376, 53 S. W. 557 (1899).
12Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Gilstrap, 77 Kan. 191, 94 Pac. 122 (1908).
See Gatzow v. Buening, io6 Wis. I, 8i N. W. 1003 (igoo), dictum that where
defendant rented a hearse to plaintiff for the funeral of his child and removed the
hearse just before the body was to be placed in it, as a result of which the body
had to be taken to the grave in a carriage, exemplary damages were warranted.
"Wertheim v. Chicoutimi Pulp Co., [I9II] A. C. 3oi; Wicker v. Hoppock, 6
Wall. 94 (U. S. 1867); 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 1338; (1926) I CORNELL
LAw QuARTERLY 540.
143 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 1338. 153 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1341.
"Quirk v. Thomas; Smith v. Hall, both supra note 4. Contra: Yale v. Curtiss,
71 Hun 436, 24 N. Y. Supp. 981 (1893), rev'd, on another ground, 151 N. Y. 598,
45 N. E. 1125 (1897); Sanborn v. Bay, 194 Fed. 35i (C. C. A. 8th, 1912) semble;
Ableman v. Holman, 195 Wis. 102,217 N. W. 689 (1928) seMble.
"Quirk v. Thomas, [1915] I K. B. 798, [19x6] I K. B. 516; Greenup v. Stoker, 7
Ill. 688 (1845); Burks v. Shain, 2 Bibb 341 (Ky. 1811).
1Giese v. Schultz, 53 Wis. 462, io N. W. 598 (188i), 65 Wis. 487, 27 N. W.
353 (1886).
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The causation must be traceable not merely to a violation of the
defendant's right, but such violation must also be a breach of some
portion of the agreement between the parties. Certain elements of
recovery in breach of promise which seem to fall outside this rulewill
be found to constitute exceptions more apparent than real.
Thus aspersions by defendant subsequent to breach, whether made
out of court 9 or in the course of the breach of promise action,20
either in pleadings2' or evidence,22 attacking plaintiff's character as
to chastityn or otherwise,s unless privileged,21 may be considered
in damages. The explanation is that a contract to marry creates
the confidential relationship of betrothal,2 and all contracts creating
19Osmun v. Winters, supra note 2; Chesley v. Chesley, io N. H. 327 (1839).
Contra: Greenup v. Stoker, supra note 17.
20Luther v. Shaw, supra note 6; Reed v. Clark, 47 Cal. 194 (x873); Blackburn v.
Mann, 85 Ill. 222 (1877).
uHaymond v. Saucer, supra note 3; Davis v. Single, 27 Mo. 6oo (1859). The
distinction made in Leavitt v. Cutler, 37 Wis. 46 (1875), excluding from con-
sideration pleadings withdrawn before trial and affidavits filed in interlocutory
proceedings, hardly seems desirable. A better rule is laid down in Smith v.
Compton, 67 N. J. L. 548, 52 Atl. 386 (1902), to the effect that any paper filed in
the proceedings which tends to humiliate the plaintiff even in the eyes of her own
witnesses or counsel ought to be considered.
nBroyhrll v. Norton, supra note 4; Berry v. Da Costa, L. R. I C. P. 33i (I866);
Kniffen v. McConnell, 30 N. Y. 285 (1864). Arguments of counsel should follow
the same rule but the only decision on the point is contra. Pearce v. Stace, 207
N. Y. 506, ioI N. E. 434 (1913).
2nWhether alleging improper conduct with defendant (Broyhill v. Norton,
supra note 4; Chesley v. Chesley, supra note ig) or with others. Luther v. Shaw,
supra note 6; Osmun v. Winters, supra note 2; Haymond v. Saucer, supra note 3;
Blackburn v. Mann; Reed v. Clark, both supra note 20; Leavitt v. Cutler; Davis
v. Slagle, both supra note 21; Berry v. Da Costa; Kniffen v. McConnell, both
supra note 22.24Broyhill v. Norton, supra note 4; Chesley v. Chesley, supra note ig.
2E. g.: a defence of the action made in good faith is privileged. Pearce v.
Stace, supra note 22 [overruling on this point Chellis v. Chapman, supra note 6;
Thorn v. Knapp, supra note 3; Southard v.'Rexford, 6 Cowen 254 (N. Y. 1826)];
Albertz v. Albertz, 78 Wis. 72, 47 N. W. 95 (I89O); Fidler v. McKinley, 21 Ill.
3o8 (i859). Contra: relying on the now overruled decisions in New York, Osmun
v. Winters, supra note 2; Kaufman v. Fye, 99 Tenn. 145, 42 S. W. 25 (1897). A
defence is presumed to be in good faith, hence the fact of bad faith must be found
by the jury to avoid the privilege. Albertz v. Albertz, supra. But if the attack on
plaintiff's character is without reasonable cause (Broyhill v. Norton, supra note 4)
or reasonable hope of proof (Luther v. Shaw, supra note 6), or if defendant en-
tirely fails to offer evidence to support the allegations of his pleadings (Davis v.
Slagle, supra note 2r), bad faith may be inferred.
28Shea's Appeal, 121 Pa. 302, 15 Atl. 629 (1888); Pierce v. Pierce, 71 N. Y. 154
(1877); Russell v. Russell, 129 Fed. 434 (S. D. N. J. 19o4); Taylor v. Taylor,
i44 Ill. 436,33 N. E. 532 (z893); COOLEY, ToRTs (2d ed. I888) 597.
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a confidential relationship include an agreement implied in fact that
neither party shall act in regard to the subject matter of the contract
to the other's detriment even after the relationship has terminated.27
The most usual breach of this implied agreement is by the disclosure
of confidential information obtained by means of the relationship,28
but it would seem that false statements purporting to be disclosures
fall within the same reasoning.29
This should be especially true of the contract to marry and the
relationship of betrothal involving, as they do, a state of utmost
trust and confidence between the parties. Third persons naturally
incline to believe statements by either party concerning the other
even if made after the contract and relationship have terminated,
simply because of the peculiar opportunity for knowledge which the
relationship affords. Accordingly, since the existence of the relation-
ship has placed the defendant in a position where aspersions by him
are of great injury to the plaintiff, such aspersions are a clear breach
of an implied term of the contract. The breach of this implied term
and that of the principal contract to marry are inextricably bound up
together, and full justice to the plaintiff can only be done by per-
mitting recovery for both injuries in one action. To allow this is but a
slight extension of the principle that entire damages for the breach
of a contract should be recovered in one action0 and of the modem
policy in favor of the settlement of all litigation concerning the same
transaction or subject in one action.31 For like reasons, in a case
27E. g.: relationships of principal and agent, Lamb v. Evans, [1893] I Ch. 218;
professor and student, Abernethy v. Hutchinson, 3 L. J. Ch. 209 (1825); attorney
and client, In re Cowdery, 69 Cal. 32, IO Pac. 47 (1886); physician and patient
AB v. CD, 3o Sc. Sess. Cas. 177 (1851).28Lamb v. Evans; Abernethy v. Hutchinson; AB v. CD, all supra note 27.29The statements need not be such as it would be improper to disclose if true.
Thus, for example, the defendant on the trial is privileged to show plaintiff's
unchastity but if he should assert it falsely and in bad faith it falls within the
reasoning above.
3Geiser Thresher Machine Co. v. Farmer, 27 Minn. 428, 8 N. W. i4I (1881);
Stevens v. Lockwood, 13 Wend. 644 (N. Y. x835); Baird v. United States, 96
U. S. 4,3o (1877).
31jones v. Steamship Cortes, 17 Cal. 487 (z861); Craft Refrigerating Machine
Co. v. Quinnipiac Brewing Co., 63 Conn. 551, 29 AtI. 76 (1893); Emerson v.
Nash, 124 Wis. 369, 102 N. W. 921 (i9o5). In the case last cited the court, at
386, 102 N. W. at 927, said in discussing what constituted one transaction with-
in the meaning of the policy above mentioned: "However numerous may be the
minor transactions, each constituting a primary right enforceable by the proper
remedy, so long as they all reach back to the point of union as the parent cause
thereof,-the connection between such point of unity and the various results
enforceable as separate grounds of complaint being sufficiently close that the
DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF PROMISE
where the plaintiff has made her engagement known to friends, if
defendant after breaking it denies that it ever existed, his denial
should be considered in damages,32 since under the circumstances
such denial amounts to an aspersion on the plaintiff's character.
The same reasons apply to give damages where after breach the de-
fendant uttersinsults (not amounting to aspersions on character) 3 to8
or concerning5 the plaintiff.
Seduction also is a breach of the agreement implied in the con-
tract.3 It presents, it is true, the seeming anomaly of a breach of
former may clearly be seen to be the proximate cause, so to speak, of the latter,-
they all grow or arise out of one transaction." This the court, at 388, 102 N. W.
at 928, illustrated as follows: "A enters into a contract with B. Out of that
circumstance grows the right of each against the other to the performance of the
contract. That right is the first essential or step to the creation of a cause of
action. It necessarily must precede the existence of such cause. Subsequently,
that right is violated. In that we have the final essential or step to the creation
of a cause of action. There may be several such rights and several such vio-
lations, hence, necessarily, several such causes of action... each set thereof
reaching back to the major transaction in which they unite and from which they
arise in the regular course of events. Going back from one completed cause of
action to the point of unity and thence to another such cause we discover the
proximate relation between them. The cause or circumstance upon which all
depend is the transaction." (Italics mine.) It is impossible not to feel that this
reasoning applies strongly to breach of promise especially where aspersions on the
plaintiff's character are in question. The connection, furthermore, between
the violation of fiduciary duty and the breach of the principal term of the contract,
the promise to marry, is so close that to consider either alone is to take too limited
a view of the situation to permit of thorough justice. One is inclined to say with
the Supreme Court of Indiana that in such cases "there is no good reason why one
verdict may not accomplish a complete adjustment of all matters within the
proper scope of the investigation." Haymond v. Saucer, supra note 3, at io.
12Vanderpool v. Richardson, 52 Mich. 336, 17 N. W. 936 (1883).
33E. g. obscene language, Osmun v. Winters, supra note 2, contra: Greenleaf v.
McColley, 14 N. H. 3o3 (1843); loud and public talk about the case and proposals
to conceal the breach by pretense of marriage, Baldy v. Stratton, ii Pa. 316
(1849).
3140smunv. Winters, supra note 2. Contra: Greenleaf v. McColley, supranote.33.
n"aldy v. Stratton, supra note 33.
36"[S]eduction.. .brought about in reliance upon the contract,... is in itself in
no very indirect way a breach of its implied conditions. Such an engagement
brings the parties necessarily into very intimate and confidential relations, and the
advantage taken of these relations by the seducer is as plain a breach of trust in all
its essential features as any advantage gained by a trustee, or guardian, or con-
fidential adviser, who cheats a confiding ward, or beneficiary, or client, into a
losing bargain. It only differs from ordinary breaches of trust in being more
heinous." Sheahan v. Barry, 27 Mich. 217, 219 (1873); 4 SumRLANI), DAM-
AGES (4th ed. 1916) § 984; COOLEY, TORTS (2nd ed. 1888) 597. See Wells v.
Padgett, 8 Barb. 323 (N. Y. 185o).
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contract to which the injured party has assented,37 but mere assent
of the injured party to a transaction is not conclusive against his
recovery where a fiduciary relation exists. The very existence of a
confidential relation makes it possible for one of the parties to possess
such influence over the other party thereto that all transactions
between them will be jealously scanned and, if found to be incon-
sistent with the utmost good faith, will form a basis for recovery
by the injured party. 8 If this be true of ordinary confidential re-
lationships and the influence ordinarily arising from them,39 much
more should it be true of the relation of betrothal and the over-
whelming power of affection between man and woman. In spite of
all modem theorizing about the equality of the sexes and the freedom
of woman, in the relation of betrothal there is not and cannot be
equality. Once having given the man the full love and confidence
which the relation implies the woman has in very large measure
entrusted herself to his honor. She is in the highest sense of the word
cestui qui trust. While perhaps it is too much to say with the Supreme
Court of Tennessee 0 that seduction naturally follows if the man is
base enough, yet it is clear that the parties are not on an equality;
the woman is the weaker, the victim of the act.41 While it seems in-
accurate to denounce it as a fraud2 or cheat 43 as some courts do,
still the breach of fiduciary duty is plain.
It is argued that to say that seduction is a breach of the contract
37For this reason some courts have denied recovery for seduction in breach of
promise actions. Wrynn v. Downey, 27 R. I. 454, 63 Atl. 4oi (i9o6); Weaver v.
Bachert, 2 Pa. 80 (845); Burks v. Shain, supra note 17. The overwhelming
weight of authority, however, favors such recovery. Luther v. Shaw, supra
note 6; Davis v. Pryor, 3 Ind. Terr. 396, 58 S. W. 66o (igoo); Liese v. Meyer,
i43 Mo. 547, 45 S. W. 282 (1897); Osmun v. Winters, supra note 2; Schmidt v.
Durnham, 46 Minn. 227, 49 N. W. 126 (1891); Bird v. Thompson, 96 Mo. 424,
9 S. W. 788 (1888); Bennett v. Beam, 42 Mich. 346, 4 N. W. 8 (i88o); Wilbur v.
Johnson, 58 Mo. 6oo (1875); Kelley v. Riley, io6 Mass. 339 (187I); Matthews
v. Cribbett, i Ohio St. 330 (i86o); Goodall v. Thurman, supra note 6; Coil v.
Wallace, supra note i; King v. Kersey, 2 Ind. 402 (i85o); Green v. Spencer, 3 Mo.
318 (1834); Hill v. Maupin, 3 Mo. 323 (1834); Whalen v. Layman, 2 Blacld. 194
(Ind. 1828); Coryell v. Colbaugh, supra note 6; Berry v. Da Costa, supra note 22.
3$Allcard v. Skinner, 36 Ch. D. i45 (1887); Nichols v. McCarthy, 53 Conn. 299,
23 Atl. 93 (I885); Wickier v. Cook, 85 Ill. 68 (1877).
39And note that a ward may sue her guardian for seduction in breach of hip
fiduciary duty. Welsund v. Schueller, 98 Minn. 475, io8 N. W. 483 (19o6).
'
0 In Conn v. Wilson, 2 Overton 233 (Tenn. 1813).
4 tWells v. Padgett, supra note 36.
4Tubbs v. Van Kleek, 12 Ill. 446 (1851); Perry v. Orr, 35 N. J. L. 295 (187r);
Stokes v. Mason, 85 Vt. x64, 81 Atl. 162 (1911).
4'Wells v. Padgett, supra note 36; Morton v. Fenn, 3 Douglas 2 11 (783)
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involves the absurdity of supposing that the woman could sue the
man therefor even though he was always ready and willing to marry.
Clearly no such action would lie. But this is not because there is no
cause of action, but because public policy requires that in this situ-
ation marriage shall if possible take place and to this end decrees
that the willingness of the man to marry shall pass the sponge of
oblivion over all causes of action, criminal" as well as civil,45 which
might by causing dissension between the parties make their marriage
less probable. The only possible solution, therefore, is to defer the
cause of action for the breach of this implied term of the contract
until the breach of the main provision, the promise to marry, and
then to treat the seduction, as indeed it is," as in aggravation of the
principal breach.47
4State v. Otis, 135 Ind. 267, 34 N. E. 954 (1893); People v. Gould, 70 Mich.
240, 38 N. W. 232 (1888).
4-Except where the rights of third parties are involved. Eichar v. Kistler, 14
Pa. 282 (185o); Henneger v. Lomas, 145 Ind. 287, 44 N. E. 462 (x896).
4"Seduction aggravates the damage from the breach of the principal contract in
that it leaves the plaintiff in a much worse situation after the breach of the en-
gagement. Osmun v. Winters, supra note 2; Kelley v. Riley, supra note 37;
Coryell v. Colbaugh, supra note 6. Breach of the principal term of the contract
might also be considered as in aggravation of the breach involved in the seduction
since marriage would prevent many of the evil consequences therefrom. Tubbs
v. Van Kleek, supra note 42.
47Luther v. Shaw, supra note 6; Stokes v. Mason, supra note 42; Davis v.
Pryor, Wilbur v. Johnson, both supra note 37; Coil v. Wallace, supra note 1;
Wells v. Padgett, supra note 36; King v. Kersey, Green v. Spencer, Hill v.
Maupin, all supra note 37. That a breach of the man's fiduciary duty in respect
of the woman's virtue, though pardoned at the time, yet subsists as a cause of
action to aggravate damages in case of eventual breach of the principal contract,
is well illustrated by the case of Kaufman v. Fye, supra note 25, where an attempt
to seduce the plaintiff, made, repulsed, and pardoned long before the breach of
the engagement, was permitted to aggravate damages. (The extension of the
rule to such a case is questionable, however.) It is sometimes said [e. g. in Tyler v.
Salley, 82 Me. 128, 19 Atl. 107 (1889)] that seduction, while in aggravation of
damages, is not an element of damages and that juries should be instructed to
that effect. This seems to require of 5urors a transcendental degree of meta-
physical discrimination. The truth would seem to be that seduction is both an
element of damage in itself [Haymondv. Saucer, supra note 3; Wilbur v. Johnson,
supra note 371 and an aggravation of other elements of damages. See note
46, supra. The failure to recognize seduction except as an aggravation of damages
has unfortunate results which will be later considered. Seduction before promise
made cannot, of course, be considered in damages in any way. Salchert v. Reinig,
135 Wis. I94, xi5 N. W. 132 (19o8); Espy v. Jones, 37 Ala. 379 (i86I); Burks v.
Shain, supra note 17. Bishop's argument to the contrary (i BIsHoP, MARRIAGE,
DIVORCE, AND SEPARATION (I89i) §§ 232 and 233) overlooks the public policy
against permitting recovery for mere sexual intercourse, a very different thing
from seduction under promise of marriage. Stokes v. Mason, supra note 42.
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Since seduction is a breach of a subsidiary term of the main contract
and a cause of action in itself, it must be alleged in the pleadings in
order to be recovered for in damages.48  Certain other elements of
damage must be specially alleged in the pleadings because of the
general rule that, in order to prevent surprise,49 damages which
the law does not imply from the cause of action itself, 0 i. e. damages
which do not necessarily arise from the facts stated in the cause of
action,"' must be specially pleaded. This rule is clearly recognized in
breach of promise cases-2 Thus pregnancy, 3 the birth of a child,4
loss of health, 5 and abortion and attempted abortion 6 are elements
of damage only recovered for if pleaded7 as special damages.
The term special damages is also used in another sense. It has
been laid down that an action for breach of promise will not survive
the death of either the plaintiff58 or the defendant 9 in the absence of
special survival statutes. 0 This is in accordance with the common-
law maxim, Actio personalis moritur cum persona, which as applied to
contracts requires that all damages arising from contracts purely
A detailed consideration of the damages recoverable for seduction will be made
infra in connection with elements of damage.
48Hendry v. Ellis, 61 Fla. 277, 54 So. 797 (1911); Cates v. McKenney, 48 Ind.
562 (1874). Contra: Poehlmann v. Kertz, 204 Ill. 4x8, 68 N. B. 467 (1903);
Jennette v. Sullivan, 63 Hun 361 (N. Y. 1892).
49Teagarden v. Hetfield, i1 Ind. 522 (1858).
BOAdams v. Barry, io Gray 366 (Mass. 1858).
b1Moses v. Antuono, 56 Fla. 499, 47 So. 794 (69o8).
'STyler v. Salley, supra note 47; Ferguson v. Moore, 98 Tenn. 342, 39 S. W. 341
(1896); Hendry v. Ellis, supra note 48; Bedell 1. Powell, 13 Barb. 183 (N. Y.
1852); Glasscock v. Shell, 57 Tex. 215 (1882).
53Tyler v. Salley, supra note 47.
54Tyler v. Salley, supra note 47; Hendry v. Ellis, supra note 48.56Tyler v. Salley, supra note 47; Bedell v. Powell, supra note 52.
'AFergason v. Moore, supra note 52.
57 0ne court requires malice to be alleged in order for exemplary damages to be
recovered. Hively v. Golnick, 123 Minn. 498, i44 N. W. 2x3 (1913). No other
such holding has been found and it is believed to be entirely exceptional.
8 Chamberlain v. Williamson, 2 M. & S. 408 (1814); Hovey v. Page, 55 Me.
142 (1867); Hegerich v. Keddie, 99 N. Y. 258, 1 N. E. 787 (1885).
59Finlay v. Chirney, 2o Q. B. D. 494 (1887); Grubb's Administrator v. Sult, 32
Grattan 203 (Va. 1879); Chasev. Fitz, 132 Mass. 359 (6882).
G0For cases under statutes held to cause the action to survive, see Stewart v.
Lee, 7o N. H. I81, 46 Atl. 31 (1899); Allen v. Baker, 86 N. C. 91 (1882), Louis-
iana appears to have a peculiar rule that the action survives if the defendant is
put in default by a demand made upon him to fulfill the engagement. Johnson v.
Levy, 18 La. 447, 43 So. 46 (6907). See generally (x916) 2 CORNELL LAW
QUARTERLY 42.
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personal,"1 that is to say contracts involving no injury to property,62
do not survive the death of either party thereto. The reason of this
rule would require that if property damage were specially alleged it
might be recovered for, and this has been repeatedly intimated.6
As no breach of promise case has yet arisen in which such damages
have been held to have been caused, it has been suggested that these
intimations were merely thrown out ex maiore cautela to provide
against the chance of a highly improbable case,6 and that it is to be
expected that no such damages will ever be awarded. 5 It is con-
ceded, however,6s that if, for example, one party should have ac-
quired valuable property from the other by means of the betrothal
relationship, in case of breach a right on the contract to recover an
amount equal to the value of such property will survive the death of
either party.
67
c. The Rule in Hadley v. Baxendale
Yet another rule of contract damages which applies to the action
for breach of promise of marriage is the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale.66
Liability extends to all the natural results of the breach. Thus,
where the breach of the marriage promise is accompanied by a breach
of the implied term of the contract against seduction,69 resulting
6tFitzgerald v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 15 Tex. Civ. App. 143, 40 S. W.
42I (1897).
62Best v. Vedder, 58 How. Prac. 187 (N. Y. 1879); Morton v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 13o N. C. 299, 41 S. E. 484 (1902).
"See Finlay v. Chirney, supra note 59; Quirk v. Thomas, supra note 4; Hovey v.
Page, supra note 58; Grubb's Administrator v. Sult; Chase v. Fitz, both supra
note 59; 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1945.
"Chase v. Fitz, supra note 59.
"See (1915) 28 HARv. L. REV. 70.
"Chase v. Fitz, supra note 59.
6In such a case the injured party might also have guantum valebant for goods
sold and delivered. For an interesting case where relief in the above situation
was so obtained, see Frazer v. Boss, 66 Ind. i, (1879).
189 Exch. 341, 354 (1854): "Where two parties have made a contract which
one of them has broken, the damage which the party ought to receive in respect
of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be con-
sidered either arising naturally, i. e. according to the usual course of things, from
such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have
been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the
probable result of the breach of it." See (1926) ii CoRNELL LAW QUARTERLY 54O.
"9Wilbur v. Johnson, supra note 37; Musselman v. Barker, 26 Neb. 737, 42
N. W. 759 (1889). Contra: Dalrymple v. Green, 88 Kan. 673, 129 Pac. 1145
(1913); Bowes v. Sly, 96 Kan. 388, 152 Pac. 17 (1915). The decisions to the same
effect in Giese v. Schultz, supra note 18, are explained away by a dictum in
Gauerke v. Kiley, 171 Wis. 543, 177 N. W. 889 (1920).
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pregnancy and birth of a child"0 are to be considered in damages.7'
The branch of the rule relating to the contemplation of the parties is
illustrated by a case7 2 where liability was imposed for physical injury
to the plaintiff which might reasonably have been anticipated by the
defendant because of his special knowledge as a physician. 73
d. Mitigation of Damages
No case on the duty to mitigate damages in breach of promise has
been discovered. It is believed that the duty is not applicable
because of the peculiar nature of the damages involved. No class of
them admits of mitigation. A duty cannot be placed upon the
plaintiff to use her best efforts to secure another mate of wealth,
character, and pleasing qualities as near as may be to defendant's
in order to mitigate the loss of the value of the marriage.7 4 Marriage,
the nexus of all human relationships, is of too great importance to be
entered upon merely to relieve a wrongdoer from liability. Injuries
to health, nerves, feelings, mental suffering, all the intangible yet
very real injuries which so characterize breach of promise of marriage
cannot be mitigated through any effort of the plaintiff. Even if they
may, the defendant can hardly be permitted to say, "Your love for
me was too great, you should not have permitted it to affect you so
gravely, it unduly enhanced my damages."
70Musselman v. Barker, supra note 69; Liese v. Meyer, supra note 37. Confra:
Bowes v. Sly, supra note 69.
'Infection with venereal disease should follow the same rule, but the few de-
cisions on the point are to the contrary. Bowes v. Sly, supra note 69; Churan v.
Sebesta, 131 Ill. App. 330 (1907). But an English court has refused to strike out
an allegation of such infection from the declaration. The motion was on the
ground that the pleading was scandalous but both court and counsel assumed
that, although there might be doubt as to whether the infection could be pleaded,
there was none that it could be shown and considered in damages. Millington v.
Loring, 6 Q. B. D. 19o (i88o).
.
72Duff v. Judson, x6o Mich. 386, 125 N. W. 371 (i9io). The principle appears,
however, to have been pushed too far in the case cited. To hold defendant for
physical injuries arising merely because a breach of contract compelled plaintiff
to perform injurious manual labor seems quite unjustifiable. As well permit an
action of damage for death if, in consequence of a discharge by his employer in
breach of his contract, being unable to obtain other work, a laborer starved to
death.
73It is submitted that "contemplation of the parties" actually means con-
templation of the defendant.
For discussion of the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale as applied to breach of promise
of marriage, see Quirk v. Thomas, supra note i7; Finlay v. Chirney, supra note 59.
W4Though where she actually does so it has been held to be in mitigation. Able-
man v. Holman, supra note 36.
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e. Certainty of Damages
The rule as to certainty of damages is also without application to
breach of promise, or rather all the elements of damage therein are
such as not to fall within it. But neither is it applicable to other
contracts in certain circumstances. "When, from the nature of the
case," says the Supreme Court of Michigan,7 5 "the amount of
the damages cannot be estimated with certainty... we can see no
objection to placing before the jury all the facts and circumstances
of the case, having any tendency to show damages, or their probable
amount; so as to enable them to make the most intelligible and prob-
able estimate which the nature of the case will permit." This is
always the case in breach of promise. The so-called pecuniary value
of the prospective marriage76 cannot be reckoned with any certainty,
though the method of designating it might cause that impression.
It is not a claim for damages for the loss of an opportunity to obtain
an amount, a dower interest in the defendant's estate for example. 77
It is rather for the loss of such non-pecuniary things as the prospect
of a permanent home7 8 and an advantageous establishment 9 and
that very non-monetary element, the condition in life80 or social
position s' which the plaintiff would have attained by the marriage,
which is compensated under this head. It is in fact compensation
for the loss of a greater opportunity for enjoying life. It is true
that the pecuniary circumstances2 of the defendant are considereds
but only to show the probability of such loss.M His pecuniary ability
"In Allison v. Chandler, ii Mich. 542, 555 (1863). And see i SEDGWICK,
DAmAGE-s (gth ed. 1912) § i7oa.
71The term "value of the marriage" first appears in Coolidge v. Neat, 129
Mass. 146 (188o), a case containing a detailed analysis of the elements of damage
in breach of promise which has been widely followed.
"7Parsons v. Trowbridge, 226 Fed. I5 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915).
78Harrison v. Swift, 13 Allen i44 (Mass. 1866).
Coolidge v. Neat, supra note 76.
'
0 Stratton v. Dole, 45 Neb. 472, 63 N. W. 875 (r895).
8 Berry v. Da Costa, supra note 22; Perkins v. Hersey, i R. I. 493 (1851).
"-These are generally proved by general reputation (Chellis v. Chapman, supra
note 6) but modem cases display a tendency to permit the details of defendant's
property to be shown, Clark v. Hodges, 65 Vt. 273, 26 Atl 726 (1893). This,
however, is a question of the law of evidence rather than that of damages.
81Ableman v. Holman, supra note 16; Smillie v. Mendoza, 68 Colo. 46r, 19o
Pac. 533 (1920); Stratton v. Dole, supra note 8o; Chellis v. Chapman, supra note
6; Allen v. Baker, supra note 6o; Coolidge v. Neat, supra note 76; Bennett v.
Beam, supra note 37; Douglas v. Gausman, 68 Ill. 170 (1875); Berry v. Da Costa;
Kniffen v. McConnell, both supra note 22. The rule is the same in the unusual
case where the woman is defendant. Harrison v. Cage, Carthew 467 (1699).
"This is well indicated by the summary of reasons for considering the de-
fendant's property, given in Bennett v. Beam, supra note 37, at 350: "[W]hat
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is not the measure of damages.,, It would seem that a showing of a
given amount of wealth should not be the sole determinative of the
value of the marriage. It should be permissible to show whether
the defendant is of a miserly or of a free-handed nature, whether he
is of retiring habits or is accustomed to go much into society, as indi-
cating whether the union would have afforded the plaintiff the happi-
ness value which the amount of wealth in question would prima
facie indicate.
Much less are damages from mental suffering and injuries to
health, nerves, feelings, and affections capable of certain measure-
ment in money 6 Yet one is not for that reason to be deprived of all
redress for such inflictions87
f. Entirety of Damages
The rule as to entirety of recovery applies to actions for breach of
promise with the utmost strictness. This is so clear that no question
has ever been raised concerning it and it would be difficult for the
loss is it that the plaintiff has sustained by a breach of the contract? To de-
termine this we must look at the surroundings and see what it was to which the
defendant invited her. If it was to a home of poverty and a life of probable
hardship and misery, the loss would apparently be small; but if it was to a home
possessed of and surrounded by all the comforts and even the luxuries of life, and
where her social position in the circles in which she would move by right of the
marriage would be the very best, the case would be exactly the opposite, because
in such case there would be abundant promise of social and domestic happiness.
But beyond this the very marriage confers certain rights in the husband's real and
personal estate of which she cannot afterwards be deprived except by her own
consent, and she would naturally and justly look to them as her security against
becoming dependent through the accidents and misfortunes of life." The passages
italicized clearly show that it is solely as evidence of the plaintiff's prospective
happiness that the property of defendant is considered.
"'Goodall v. Thurman, supra note 6.
8'Goodhart v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 177 Pa. i,35 Atl. i91 (1896); Ransom
v. New York & Erie Railroad Co., 1S N. Y. 415 (1857); Southern Cotton Oil
Co. v. Skipper, 125 Ga. 368, 54 S. E. 11o (19o6); cases of physical pain. Head v.
Georgia Pacific Railway Co., 79 Ga. 358, 7 S. B. 217 (1887); Young v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 107 N. C. 70, 12 S. E. 45 (189o); Ballou v. Farnum, ri
Allen 73 (Mass. i865); cases of mental suffering. But see criticism of Southern
States' decisions on mental suffering in (1926) 4 TEx. L. Rv. 270 and in (1925)
23 hcH. L. REv. 311.
"Lucas v. Flinn, 35 Iowa I (1872); Wadsworth v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., 86 Tenn. 695, 8 S. W. 574 (1888); The Little Silver, 189 Fed. 980 (D. N. J.
1911) aff'd, sub nom. New York & Long Branch Steamboat Co. v. Johnson, 195
Fed. 740 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1912). See Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v.
Burgess, 114 Ala. 587, 22 So. 169 (x896). But see law review notes cited supra
note 86.
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most speculative mind to conjecture a situation in which serious
doubt could arise as to its application. The contract to marry is
indivisible. All damages for breach of the promise to marry, though
some of them, such as the loss of the value of the marriage, bear
reference to the whole future life of the plaintiff, are incurred at one
time of breach. Even breaches of subsidiary terms of the contract,
such as we have considered in the case of seduction,8 8 and shall con-
sider in the case of abortion,89 are deferred because of public policy
until the principal breach. It is true, 10 that breach of a subsidiary
term of the contract by way of insult or defamation may be made not
only subsequent to breach but even on the very trial of the action.
Yet it is inconceivable that any separate action for this qua breach of
contract could be maintained. As before said the breach of such
implied term and that of the principal contract are so inextricably
bound up together that full justice to both parties requires that all
circumstances of both breaches should be considered in one action.
This is not to say that a separate action will not lie qua tort for wrongs
inflicted in breach of a contract to marry. The usual rule, 9' that
where a wrong is both a tort and a breach of contract, suit may be
brought on either breach of duty, applies. Thus it has been held that
where a married man promises marriage to a woman who believes him
unmarried she may have an action in tort for deceit against him.Y
It would seem that similarly such an action should lie for conceal-
ment of other facts rendering valid marriage impossible, such as
impotency and consanguinity, if a case can be imagined wherein the
latter impediment would be peculiarly within the knowledge of
the defendant. 93 And it is submitted that concealment of facts
rendering the prospective marriage voidable at the will of the de-
fendant should base an action for deceit equally with concealment
of facts rendering it void, for the plaintiff relies on representations
that defendant is in a position to marry in a manner that will bind
him. She expects a regular, not a companionate, marriage.
It would seem clear also that where a breach of a subsidiary term
of the contract is also a tort the appropriate tort action will lie.
8 Supra page 371. 89Infra page 388.
"°As we have seen supra page 369 ef seq.
9"Dean v. McLean, 48 Vt. 412 (1875); Kinlyside v. Thornton, 2 W. Bl. IIIx
(1776); Brown v. Boorman, ii Cl. & Fin. 1 (1844); see ADDISON, ToRTs (8th ed.
i9o6) x6. 2Pollock v. Sullivan, 53 Vt. 507 (88 x).
nThe rule that deceit does not lie where both parties have equal means for
knowing the truth would, of course, apply. Boulden v. Stilwell, ioo Md. 543, 6o
Atl. 6o9 (i905); Vernon v. Keys, x2 East 632 (1x8o); Slaughter's Administrator
v. Gerson, 13 Wall. 379 (U. S. 1871).
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Thus for aspersions on the other party to the contract slander or
libel may be had, for abortion-trespass for battery,9 for seduction"5
and for insults"-special statutory actions in the states which permit
them. So clear is it that such actions will lie that the only question is
whether they will bar further recovery in an action on the contract
to marry. It has been decided 7 that a recovery in a statutory action
for seduction does not bar a later action for breach of marriage
promise. This seems eminently just for seduction is but one element
of the damage suffered. The plaintiff should not, however, enjoy a
double recovery for the seduction by having it again considered in
damages in the latter action. It would be absurd to insist on this
elementary statement were it not for strong dicta98 to the effect
that in the analogous case of recovery for aspersions on plaintiff's
character in the action for breach of promise a later recovery in
slander or libel is not barred. This absurdity is directly caused by
the error of considering the injuries arising from breaches of the im-
plicit fiduciary terms of the contract as being in aggravation of
damages but not an element thereof.9 9 On the high degree of dis-
crimination which such a rule requires of the jury we have previously
remarked.100 On the injustice that might result from it no more
need be said. It is to be hoped that courts will not persist in a line of
reasoning which is both illogical and pernicious.
4See White v. Murtland, 71 Ill. 250 (1874); Miller v. Bayer, 94 Wis. 123, 68
N. W. 869 (1896).
9Seduction has been made a statutory tort in the following American juris-
dictions: Alabama, California, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Mississippi, Oregon, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Washington. A like result has been obtained in
Michigan and North Carolina by strained construction. See Watson v. Watson,
49 Mich. 540, 14 N. W. 489 (1883); Weiher v. Meyersahm, 5o Mich. 602, 16
N.W. i6o (i883); Hood v. Sudderth, iii N. C. 215, 16 S. E. 397 (1892).
9
'Several states, e. g. Virginia, West Virginia, and Mississippi, have established
a special statutory action for insulting language. See VA. CODE ANN. (1924)
§ 5781; W. VA. CODE ANN. (Barnes, 1923) c. 103, § 2; Miss. ANN. CODE (Heming-
way, 1927) § I.
9'7 n Ireland v. Emmerson, 93 Ind. I (1883):
OsIn Roberts v. Druillard, 123 Mich. 286, 82 N. W. 49 (i9oo), and Spencer v.
Simmons, i6o Mich. 292, 125 N. W. 9 (191o).
99This distinction is best explained in Hickey v. Kimball, 1o9 Me. 433, 84 At.
943 (1912).
A like result is produced in actions for the breach of other contracts where
defamatory matter is proved in aggravation of damages. See a remark of Baron
Parke's in Coppin v. Braithwaite, 8 Jurist 875, 876 (1844).
1'0 Note 47, supra. For a sound suggestion as to the limits of the discrimination
which should be expected of jurors, see Craker v. Chicago & Northwestern Rail-
way Co., 36 Wis. 657, 678 (1875).
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II.. THE ELEMENTS OF COMPENSATORY DAMAGE IN BREACH
OF PROMISB
a. The Value of the Marriage
So far we have considered the elements of damage in breach of
promise only incidentally. We shall now consider them in detail
to determine how far they are similar to the elements of damage
which arise from other breaches of contract. First as to the value
of the marriage, so-called. We have seen m1 that this is but com-
pensation for the loss of a greater opportunity of enjoying life, i. e.
for the difference between the circumstances in which the marriage
would probably have placed the plaintiff and those in which her life is
likely to be passed because of defendant's breach. Such an element
of damage might at first glance seem peculiar to the contract to
marry. But further investigation shows this to be untrue. The
contract most closely resembling the promise to marry would seem
to be what is commonly designated as the contract for support. The
similarity is striking. Except for the duties peculiarly connubial
there seems a complete identity between a contract to receive an-
other into one's household as a member thereof and to care for him as
such, and the contract to marry. Now the measure of damages for
the breach of a contract of this analogous class is the difference
between the care and treatment, i. e. the circumstances, to which the
person would probably have been subjected as a result of the per-
formance, and those to which he is subjected as a result of the
breach.'0 ' The analogy is complete.
b. Loss of Other Opportunity to Marry
Several items of damage usually considered as pecuniary have
been treated by the courts with exceedingly little discrimination.
One of these is loss of other opportunity to marry. The main error
here has been failure to note that the situation is totally different
where only the promise to marry is broken and where the subsidiary
term against seduction is broken also. Instructions that probable
loss of other opportunity for marriage is to be considered in damages
are approved in both cases.0 3 But such consideration is plainly
"'Supra page 377 et seg.
inVan Cleave v. Clark, 118 Ind. 61, 20 N. E. 527 (i888). Contra: Lathrop v.
Mayer, 86 Mo. App. 355 (1900).
10For typical cases, cf. Coolidge v. Neat, supra note 76, with Berry v. Da
Costa, supra note 22. For a case in which the fact that plaintiff did not lose
any other opportunity to marry was considered, see Ableman v. Holman, supra
note 16.
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wrong in the first type of case. If, by being betrothed to the de-
fendant, plaintiff has lost marriage opportunities, either directly by
refusing herself to, or avoiding the company of, other eligible suitors,
or indirectly, as in long engagements where the bloom of youth and
the prospects of being wooed fade with the passing years, these are
things given up either in preparation for, or in consideration of, the
promised marriage.104 We have seen that on no sound principle can
recovery for such things be allowed. 105 The wholly different situation
where a violation of the duty against seduction appears, permits of
rightful recovery. The fiduciary who injures his cestui's vendibility
in the marriage market06 by destroying her chastity differs only in
greater enormity from the fiduciary who damages the marketability
of her chattels. Each deprives one toward whom he is under the
highest duties of conscience and honor of a valuable asset107 for
which compensation must be made.
c. Length of the Engagement
Wrongful recovery for loss of other opportunity to marry is often
concealed under an instruction that the length of the engagement
may be considered in damages. This again is a case where the courts
104It is most commonly the indirect loss for which recovery is allowed. In fact
but two dicta have been found in which the exclusion of other suitors during the
engagement has been approved as an item of damages. Olmstead v. Hoy, 112
Iowa 349, 83 N. W. io56 (igoo); Hively v. Golnick, supra note 57. It is im-
possible to deny, however, that the logic, or lack of logic, of the cases leads to its
allowance as such. Of course plaintiff cannot recover for the loss of a suitor
whom she jilted in breach of engagement in order to become engaged to de-




°See supra page 368. Plaintiff's decreased marriageability might indeed be
considered as evidence of the value of the marriage, i. e. as indicating the differ-
ence in value between the marriage with the defendant and any probable marriage
by the plaintiff, on the analogy of damages for breach of a contract to buy goods,
the difference between the contract price and market value at the time and place
of failure-to perform. McKnight v. Dunlop, 5 N. Y. 537 (1851); Bonney v.
Blaisdell, 105 Me. 121, 73 Atl. 8xi (i9o9); Williams v. De Sota Oil Co., 213 Fed.
i 9 4 (C. C. A. 8th, I914). But this is not the theory of the courts.
'16For an interesting early case (unfortunately quoted without citation) in
which damages were allowed for injury to a man's marriageability by a battery
to his person, see MACCOLLA, BREACH OF PROMISE (1879) 4.
1°TCf. note 36, supra. The above statement is none the less true because of its
cold-blooded appearance. The most atrocious acts have their aspect of material
damage and to determine this accurately they must be dispassionately con-
sidered. This is not to say that such material damage is the only damage re-
sulting from them. The non-pecuniary damages from seduction will be later con-
sidered.
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are lacking in discrimination. Put in this broad way it is inevitably
understood by the jury to allow a recovery for the pecuniary detri-
ment to plaintiff's condition and prospects, marital and otherwise,
arising from the length of time she was pledged to the defendant.'0 '
Any such detriment was suffered either in preparation for, or in con-
sideration of, the prospective marriage. As far as pecuniary com-
pensation is possible she will be compensated if she recovers the value
of the marriage. She suffered this detriment considering that the
marriage was worth it. She has lost the marriage, the jury gives her
its value, it should not also give her the value she gave up for it.
She is not entitled to a double recovery, she cannot eat her cake and
have it too.109
But the plaintiff has suffered higher and non-pecuniary detri-
ments, on which the length of the engagement throws considerable
light. Injury to her affections"0 is an element of damage."' The
depth of those affections is therefore in question, and this may well
be affected by the length of the engagement. Shame and mortifi-
cation, mental suffering generally, arising from defendant's repudi-
ation is also an element; clearly a lengthy engagement would increase
this. In various ways in regard to these elements the length of the en-
gagement may be of decisive effect."'
d. Mental Suffering
It is a common statement that breach of promise is an exception
to the ordinary rule that mental suffering cannot be recovered for
in an action for breach of contract."3 This statement, while in a
sense true, gives a false impression. The rule is not violated but
illustrated, for the rule is that where mental suffering is the natural
and proximate result of a breach of contract or is in the contemplation
1OSAnd courts so explain the instruction in justifying it. See Grant v. Willey,
ioi Mass. 356 (1869).
209See supra page 368.
UOThe Maine Court is presumably inadvertent in referring to "loss of affection"
as an element of damage in Gerber v. Schwartz, 124 Me. 441, 127 At. 903 (1925).
reBut note that the very existence of affection on the part of the plaintiff is
not essential to enable her to recover the so-called pecuniary elements of damage.
Harrison v. Swift, 13 Allen 144 (Mass. 1866). Contra: Parks v. Marshall, 14 S. W.
(2d) 590 (Mo. 1929).
'And note the action of the courts of Maine and Wisconsin in finding dam-
ages to be excessive, the latter partially, the former wholly, on the basis of the
brevity of the engagement. Densmore v. Thurston, ii4 Me. 554, 96 Atl. o68
(1916); Ableman v. Holman, supra note x6.
"33 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1340, n. 15; HALE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 41, n.
I60; MAcCOLLA, Op. cit. supra note xo6, at 28.
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of the parties as a probable consequence of breach, recovery for it
may be had."4 It is true that this rarely occurs, comparatively
speaking, yet the cases are sufficiently numerous to demonstrate
the rule to be as above stated. Where circumstances have been
shown indicating mental suffering within it, damages therefore have
been generally allowed.115
U41 SEDGWICK, op. cit. supra note 75, § 45; BAUER, DAMAGES (1919) § 79;
W.Lis, DAMAGES (i910) § 22.
',Thus breach of a contract to furnish dresses, whereby a bride's trousseau is
deficient, will admit of such damages, Lewis v. Holmes, io9 La. 1030, 34 So. 66
(i9O3); as will breach of a contract to furnish a coffin, J. E. Dunn & Co. v. Smith,
74 S. W. 576 (Tex. Civ. App. 19o3), (not elsewhere reported); breach of a contract
to transport a corpse, Hale v. Bonner, 82 Tex. 33, 17 S. W. 6o5 (1891); breach of a
contract for transportation whereby the plaintiff is ejected from the vehicle in
an insulting manner, Coppin v. Braithwaite, supra note 99 (Court of Exchequer,
1844); Chicago & Alton Railroad Co. v. Flagg, 43 111.364 (1867); Allen v. Camden
and Philadelphia Steamboat Ferry CO., 46 N. J. L. I98 (1884); breach of a con-
tract to transmit a telegram, whereby plaintiff fails to learn of the illness of his
wife in time to reach her bedside before her death, Beasley v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 39 Fed. 181 (C. C. W. D. Tex. 1889); or where the telegram
contains a request for money of which defendant is notified plaintiff is in urgent
need, Barnes v. Western Union Telegraph Co. 27 Nev. 438, 76 Pac. 931 (1904);
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Simpson, 73 Tex. 422, II S. W. 385 (1889)
(money to transport husband's body for burial); breach of a contract to transport
a bridegroom and party to the place of wedding, Browning v. Fies, 4 Ala. App.
580, 58 So. 931 (1912); breach of a contract to transport a bride and groom on
their honeymoon trip, Central of Georgia Railway Co. v. Knight, 3 Ala. App. 436,
57 So. 253 (i9i1); breach of a contract for admission to a place of amusement,
Aaron v. Ward, 203 N. Y. 351, 96 N. E. 736 (191 I); breach of a contract to trans-
port, by use of insulting language toward the transportee, particularly if a woman,
Gillespie v. Brooklyn Heights Railroad Co., 178 N. Y. 347, 9o N. E. 857 (1904);
Palmeri v. Manhattan Railway Co., 133 N. Y. 261, 3o N. E. iooi (1892); Cham-
berlain v. Chandler, Fed. Cas. No. 2,575 (C. C. D. Mass. 1823) (per Story, J.);
Miller v. King, 84 Hun 308, 32 N. Y. Supp. 332 (1895); Cole v. Atlanta & West
Point Railroad Co. 1o2 Ga. 474, 31 S. E. 107 (1897); Knoxville Traction Co. v.
Lane, io3 Tenn. 376, 53 S. W. 557 (1899); or by the use of obscene language or
conduct or immodest or libidinous approach toward, or assault upon, such woman,
Chamberlain v. Chandler, supra; Knoxville Traction Co. v. Lane, supra; Craker
v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., supra note ioo; see remarks of Mr.
Justice Clifford in Nieto v. Clark, Fed. Cas. No. 10,262 (C. C. D. Mass. 1858);
or by permitting the same, Craker v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co.,
supra; breach in like ways of the contract between innkeeper and guest, De Wolf
v. Ford, 193 N. Y. 397, 86 N. E. 527 (1908). It is notable that perhaps the
majority of the foregoing cases are either of contracts related to one of the great
vital facts death and marriage; or are cases in which the plaintiff is a woman, and
most frequently a woman complaining of a breach of contract which is either
induced by, or more injurious because of, the fact of her sex. This is but natural,
since marriage and death both create special circumstances making it highly
probable that breach of any contract connected with either will cause mental
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Mental suffering is a thing of infinite varieties, both in actuality
and in possibility of phrasing. We shall not inquire how far the
various forms of it for which compensation is given in breach of
promise are distinguishable in fact and how far they represent mere
differences in expression. Injury to plaintiff's affections is one
form,"8 as is distress of mind, disappointment of plaintiff's reason-
able expectations,"7 public disgrace, 1 8 the general effect of the
breach on plaintiff's mind and feelings, 119 the injury to plaintiffs'
feelings,uo0 humiliation,"' mortification, 1 ' suffering from shamem
wounded pride,14 wounded spirit,"25 and anxiety of mind.126
And as it is infinite in its varieties so is it infinite also in the variety
of circumstances which may affect it and which are hence to be con-
sidered in computing the resulting damages. Any circumstance
which might tend either to increase" 7 or lessen"8 the mental suffering
of the plaintiff is to be considered. Thus the abruptness of the
breach, the causelessness of the breach, the fact that the breach is by
marriage with another,"29 the knowledge of the engagement by the
plaintiff's friends"0 or by the public'' generally, denial by defendant
anguish, and since womanhood is a continuing circumstance tending both to
induce certain wrongs (whether as breaches of contract or as torts) causing
mental anguish, and to increase the probability and degree of mental suffering
from any wrong. It is notable that all these considerations unite to support
recovery for mental anguish resulting from breach of promise of marriage.
It has been asserted that recovery for mental anguish as an element of contract
damages is peculiar to decisions of Southern States. See note 86, supra. It is
submitted that the Northern and Western authorities in the foregoing note dis-
prove this assertion.
UWilbur v. Johnson; Bird v. Thompson, both supra note 37. And see note
IO, supra. u 7Coolidge v. Neat, supra note 76.
n
8 Vanderpool v. Richardson, supra note 32; Coolidge v. Neat supra note 76.
n9Bennett v. Beam, supra note 37.
"
0 Berry v. Da Costa, supra note 22; Perkins V. Hersey, Supra note 81; Bird v.
Thompson; Wilbur v. Johnson, both supra note 37; Coolidge v. Neat, supra note
76; Thrush v. Fullhart, 230 Fed. 24 (C. C. A. 4th, 1915).
mWatson v. Bean, 2o8 Ky. 295, 270 S. W. 801 (1925); Gerber v. Schwartz,
supra note IIO.
"'Coolidge v. Neat, supra note 76; Vanderpool v. Richardson, supra note 32;
Thrush v. Fullhart, supra note 12O; Watson v. Bean, supra note 121.
mBroyhill v. Norton, supra note 4; Gerber v. Schwartz, supra note no.
"
4 Wilbur v. Johnson, Bird v. Thompson, both supra note 37; Berry v. Da
Costa, supra note 22; Thrush v. Fullhart, sura note 120.
"'Coolidge v. Neat, supra note 76. "'Thrush v. Fulihart, supra note 120.
"'Sherman v. Rawson, io2 Mass. 395 (1869).
"' Johnson v. Jenkins, 24 N. Y. 252 (1862); Leeds v. Cook, 4 Esp. 256 (18o3).
"'Vanderpool v. Richardson, supra note 32.
"'Vanderpool v. Richardson, supra note 32; Reed v. Clark, 47 Cal. 194 (1873).
mLiebrandt v. Sorg, 133 Cal. 571, 65 Pac. 1o98 (igoi).
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of the existence of the engagement, 13 heartless,' insulting, or out-
rageous'" behaviour, and malice 5 are all to be considered as in-
creasing plaintiff's mental suffering. On the other hand evidence
that defendant's breach arose from good motives and was without
malice or want of appreciation of his contract duty,136 that plaintiff
was incapable of true appreciation of defendant's society,17 or was
not of a refined nature generally,18 are all receivable in mitigation
of damages. All circumstances and acts of both parties,13 whether
-occurring within the presence 40 or immediate knowledge' of each
other or not, are to be considered. And circumstances and probable
results of the breach which are considered as evidence or elements of
so-called pecuniary damages, such as the length of the engagement
or the probable non-marriage of the plaintiff, may be considered also
as increasing the plaintiff's mental suffering.'" Damages for mental
suffering may be recovered, although none are specifically proved,
since they are implied by the breach itself.'"
e. Injury to Health
Coming to injury to health as an element of damage we find again
that it is an error to consider breach of promise as exceptional to
the ordinary rule of contracts. Again it is a mere question of the
application of the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale; where loss of health
is the natural result of the breach of a contract, and where such loss
was in the contemplation of the parties as a probable result of breach,
recovery is allowed. 1 Thus where in the dead of winter a livery-
man contracted to transport a lady, who had recently been operated
upon for appendicitis, from the hospital to her home, a breach of the
contract whereby she was compelled to walk a part of the distance
bases a recovery for resulting injury to her health.145 So also gener-
132Vanderpool v. Richardson, supra note 32.
"'Smit v. Jacobs, S. African. L. R. [1918] 0. P. D. 30.
"4Baldy v. Stratton, supra note 33.
"'Thorn v. Knapp, Haymond v.. Saucer, both supra note 3; Osmun v. Winters,
supra note 2. "Johnson v. Jenkins, supra note 128.
"'Leeds v. Cook, supra note 128. USAbleman v. lolman, supra note 16.
ulJohnson v. Jenkins, supra note 128; Sherman v. Rawson, supra note 127.
"'0Baldy v. Stratton, supra note 33; Kelly v. Highfield, supra note 2.
m'Baldy v. Stratton, supra note 33.
OCoolidge v. Neat, supra note 76. And see supra page 383.
"'Watson v. Bean, supta note 121.
'"Trout v. Watkins Livery and Undertaking Co. 148 Mo. App. 621, 130 S. W.
136 (39IO). -
'"Trout v. Watkins Livery and-Undertaking Co., supra note 144.
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ally where the breach of a contract for transportation or shelter
-results in an exposure of man or beast to the injury of the health of
either.'16 And so also for breach of a contract of lease whereby the
tenant is evicted damages for injury to health can be had.147
f. Seduction and its Consequences
It is not often that simple breach of the promise to marry produces
injury to health, though such cases do occur. 14 8 Much more com-
monly such injury results from breach of the duty against seduction.
But the whole question of damages for seduction is in a state of the
utmost confusion. This is principally due to the failure of courts to
realize seduction as in itself a breach of the contract as well as an
aggravation of damages from the principal breach. But in the first
place there is a doubt as to what is meant by seduction. One court
has attempted to limit it to the first act of intercourse and to exclude
all subsequent acts from consideration in damages. 4 9 A much more
reasonable rule is applied by the Supreme Court of Tennessee1 " to
the effect that seduction is a continuing act, continuing as long as
intercourse is obtained under promise of marriage. This is the result
to which the fundamental conception of seduction as a breach of the
fiduciary duty of the contract leads, since every act of intercourse
is a fresh breach of such duty.
The failure to treat seduction as a breach of the contract leads
some courts into peculiar restrictions on the resulting damages.
Certain injuries are barred from consideration as not being caused by
the mere breach of the promise to marry. Of course this reasoning
is not logically followed out for if it were no damages for seduction
could be recovered, for the seduction itself is not caused by the
refusal to marry. But the results are curious. While nervous illness
resulting directly from the seduction is clearly allowable in damages,
in some jurisdictions151 it would seem that pregnancy, illness re-
116McMahon v. Field, 7 Q. B. D. 59x (I881), overruling Hobbs v. London and
South Western Railway Co., L. R. io Q. B. ii (1875); Brown v. Georgia, Caro-
lina, & Northern Railway Co., ii9 Ga. 88,46 S. E. 71 (i9o3); Boothby v. Grand
Trunk Railway, 66 N. H. 342,34 Atl. 157 (1890). See 3 SEDGWICK, op. Cit. supra
note 75, § 87I. 1i 7Moyer v. Gordon, 113 Ind. 282, 14 N. E. 476 (1887).
'"Usually as a result of mental suffering. E. g. Yale v. Curtiss, supra note 16.
For an interesting case of injury to health otherwise resulting from the breach,
see Duff v. Judson, supra note 72. But as there stated, this case clearly goes too
far and is quite irreconciliable with the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale.
U'See Dalrymple v. Green, supra note 69.
150In Heggie v. Hayes, 141 Tenn. 219, 208 S. W. 6o5 (1918).
"'Schmidt v. Durnbam, 46 Minn. 227,49 N. W. 126 (i895).
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sulting therefrom, and the birth of a child is not.5 2 There are, how-
ever, courts which hold the contrary,"' and it is particularly gratify-
ing to note that two decisions" in Wisconsin which went so far as also
to deny recovery for the increased injury to reputation because of
pregnancy, are explained away by a dictum in a later case in the
same state.'"
g. Abortion
Abortion presents a special problem. It does not result proxi-
mately either from the breach of the principal contract to marry or
from that of the subsidiary duty against seduction. If caused with-
out the man's solicitation it would seem clear that he should not be
liable. On the other hand if he induces the woman to submit to it
to her injury his action seems a clear breach of fiduciary duty, the
more so as the woman's pregnant condition makes her more than
ever dependent upon him."'
h. Miscarriage
Miscarriage also should be considered in damages if it is shown
to be caused by defendant's breach, e. g., if it results from the grief or
anxiety thereby produced. But if the view be taken that pregnancy
is not admissible in damages, miscarriage, of course, can never be
considered. 17
i. Injury to Reputation
Injury to reputation is a permissible element of damage.1 s It
follows that plaintiff's bad reputation is in mitigation of damages,"19
and this whether it is bad for lewdness or for other vice. 6 ' So also
151Dalrymple v. Green, supra note 69; Tyler v. Salley, supra note 47.
'5Musselman v. Barker, supra note 69; Liese v. Meyer, supra note 37.
'
5 Giese v. Schultz (two cases of this name), supra note 18.
'5Gauerke v. Kiley, supra note 69. Rape is another breach of the fiduciary
duty of the contract which courts ha-re failed to recognize. See Giese v. Schultz,
(second decision), supra note x8. Fletcher v. Ketcham, 16o Iowa 364, 141 N. W.
916 (1916).
IuCourts which refuse to consider pregnancy in damages of course apply the
same rule to abortion in all cases. Nolan v. Glynn, 163 Iowa x46, 142 N. W.
1029 (913); Gauerke v. Kiley, supra note 69.
157Dalrymple v. Green; Bowes v. Sly, both supra note 69. As to venereal
disease see note 71, supra.
'
58Vanderpool v. Richardson, supra note 32; Coolidge v. Neat, supra note 76.
159Burnett v. Simpkins, 24 Ill. 264 (186o); Johnston v. Caulkins, i Johns.
Cas. i16 (N. Y. 1799); Dupont v. McAdow, 6 Mont. 226, 9 Pac. 925 (1886);
Baddeley v. Mortlock, Holt's N. P. 151 (I6).
16 Burnett v. Simpkins; Baddeley v. Mortlock, both supra note i59.
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plaintiff's bad conduct prior to the breach (although known to the
defendant) whether amounting to unchastityu8 or to mere indecorous
conduct6 2 is in mitigation of damages as indicating that she had
little reputation to lose. Loss of reputation or bad conduct of the
plaintiff subsequent to breach should not be considered in damages,
particularly where seduction appears, for this might enable de-
fendant to gain by the result of his own wrong.'" Derogatory reports
in circulation against the plaintiff, if shown to have basis in fact,'
are in mitigation of damages, and the fact that when the plaintiff's
attention is called to the reports by the defendant no explanation of
them is made may be sufficient to warrant the jury in considering
them as well-founded.'"
j. Elements in Mitigation of Damages
We have already seen that a wide variety of circumstances may
be in mitigation of damages and have considered many of them.'"
It would be useless to attempt to enumerate all possibilities in this
field but it may be worth while to mention a few more of the most
striking situations which the cases show.
Under the rule that a showing of good motives is in mitigation
of damages the fact that breach was caused by the objections of de-
fendant's parents is in mitigation if defendant is a youth,6 7 and if
defendant is an elderly widower the objections of his children by the
former marriage should be given equal weight 1 8 Disease of the plain-
tiff unknown to the defendant should likewise be in mitigation of
damages. 6 9
It has been held on the other hand that the shooting of defendant
by plaintiff after breach was not in mitigation.1 7 0 This result seems
1
'Denslow v. Van Horn, i6 Iowa 476 (1864); Bench v. Merrick, i Carr & K.
463 (1844); Williams v. Hollingsworth, 6 Baxter 12 (Tenn. 1873). Contra: Butler
v. Eschleman, 18 Ill. 44 (I856).
lutPalmer v. Andrews, 7 Wend. 142 (N. Y. 183I); Willard v. Stone, 7 Cowen 22
(N. Y. 1827); Johnston v. Caulkins, supra note I59.
'nBoynton v. Kellogg, 3 Mass. 189 (807). Contra: Dupont v. McAdow,
supra note 159; Willard v. Stone, supra note 162; Johnston v. Caulkins, supra note
'59.
"WAliter of mere unfounded rumors. Capeheart v. Carradine, 4 Strobhart 42
(S. C. X849). 1"Baddeley v. Mortlock, supra note x59.
"'Supra page 386.
"'Johnson v. Jenkins, supra note 128; Irving vo Greenwood, i C. & P. 35o
(1824). 'Goddard v. Westcott, 82 Mich. 180, 46 N. W. 242 (1890).
"'Goddard v. Westcott, supra note 168.
"'Schmidt v. Durnham, supra note I51.
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regrettable and also unnecessary in view of the broad modern policy
in favor of the settlement of all litigation concerning the same trans-
action or subject matter in one action.17' The fact that plaintiff's
father has recovered'7 2 or may recover' in an action in the nature of
trespass quare servitium amisit cannot, of course, mitigate plaintiff's
damages for breach of the duty against seduction.' 7' It is plain also
that an offer of marriage made subsequently to breach cannot be in
mitigation, for the trust and confidence incident to the betrothal
relation once having been destroyed cannot be renewed by the mere
desire of the defendant. 75
Such are the principles of compensatory damages in breach of
promise. The next question to be faced is that of exemplary damages.
III. E XMPLARY DmAGEs
It seems clear that in the jurisdictions which permit of exemplary
damages in any case such damages will be given in breach of
* promise, 76 In accordance, however, with the general principle that
exemplary damages are only to be given for wrongs of a particularly
outrageous character 77 a simple breach of the contract to marry will
not base exemplary damages, 7 8 and it has been held that where the
breach is occasioned by good motives they cannot be had.'7 9 Where
on the other hand circumstances of aggravation appear 80 indicating a
"'See note 31, supra. And observe that in Johnson v. Levy, supra note 6o,
suit against the personal representatives of a contract breaker who apparently
met his end upon refusing a demand of marriage made gun in hand by the plain-
tiff's father acting as her legal agent, the idea that shooting is in mitigation of
damages was not even suggested.
1'Coryell v. Colbaugh, supra note 6.
"'Goodall v. Thurman, supra note 6.
174For a recent instance in which both father and daughter recovered full
damages see Luther v. Shaw, supra note 6, and Luther v. Shaw, r57 Wis. 234, 147
N. W. x8 (x914).
"'rBennett v. Beam, supra note 37; Holloway v. Griffith, 32 Iowa 409 (1871).
"'Luther v. Shaw, Chellis v. Chapman, Goodall v. Thurman, Coryell v. Col-
baugh, all supra note 6. Trammell v. Vaughan, 158 Mo. 214, 59 S. W. 79 (1900),
often cited to the contrary, is a decision that exemplary damages are not per-
missible in any action. The jurisdictions which do not permit of exemplary
damages in any case are enumerated in I SEDGWICK, op. cit. sura note 75, §§ 358,
359; 2 SUTHERLAND, op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 395-400.
'"Supra page 367.
.?SBaumle v. Verde, 33 Okla. 243, 124 Pac. 1083 (1912); Goddard v. Westcott,
supra note 168; Dupont v. McAdow, supra note 259.
2"Johnson v. Jenkins, supra note 128; Goddard v. Westcott, supra note 168.
""Luther v. Shaw, supra note 6.
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disregard of the plaintiff's feelings and rights,1 3' especially if in-
cluding seduction,1 8 2 exemplary damages are permissible and de-
fendant's poverty is no ground for preventing them.'8
IV. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
No case of liquidated damages for breach of promise has ever been
'decided but it has been incidentally discussed in three cases. In
Box v. Day,lM4 defendant, a woman, had given a bond for £1200,
conditioned to be void if she married the plaintiff. She had married
another and the court doubted whether on the peculiar wording
of the bond it was payable now or at a future time. "The court
inclined to give judgment for the plaintiff," says the reporter, "the
parties agreed before another argument, ut audivi." Clearly no
doubt of the possibility of liquidated damages in such case pre-
sented itself to the court's mind.
In Lowe v. Peers,ls8 a covenant in the sum of £iooo "that I will
not marry with any person besides herself" being in suit, it was
held void as in restraint of marriage, Lord Mansfield and three con-
curring judges pointing out specifically that no promise to marry
appeared. The implication that if such promise appeared the cove-
nant would have been held valid seems strong here.
Finally in Abrams v. Kou-nts,8 5 a bond in the sum of a thousand
dollars conditioned "for the true performance of a marriage contract"
failed to base a recovery because the stipulated amount was desig-
nated as a "penalty" in the instrument.
From these cases it seems clear that none of the courts before
which they came doubted that liquidated damages for breach of
promise might be had. No objection in point of reason appears
against this view. On the other hand, it would seem an excellent
device, well designed to give certainty of remedy in case of breach
without the ordeal of reading of love letters, detailing of the intimate
conduct of the parties, etc., which characterize the ordinary breach
of promise trial.
'
81Chellis v. Chapman, supra note 6.
''Coryell v. Colbaugh, supra note 6. One case, Goodall v. Thurman, supra
note 6, seems to condition this upon the contract being made with intent to
seduce. The necessity for this distinction is not perceived.
283Coryell v. Colbaugh, supra note 6. And note as of especial interest a case
where the man recovered £ioo exemplary damages for the woman's "particularly
heartless" conduct. Smit v. Jacobs, supra note 133.
1"r Wils. K. B. 59 (1744).
1914 Burr. 2225 (1768). 1'4 Ohio 214 (1829).
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V. AMOUNT OF DAMAGES
As to amount of damages as in all cases where mental and physical
suffering are to be considered,8 7 since there is no method of definite
computation of damages, reliance must be placed in the sound dis-
cretion of the jury.18 8 And as it is so little possible to apply any
definite standard the verdict will not be reversed as excessive unless it
is so large as to indicate undue motives,189 (that is to say passion,
prejudice, 9 0 corruption,' 9' partiality, bias, or other unworthy
reason' 1 ) on the part of the jury. This standard for reversal seems as
indefinite as the jury standard it is meant to support. But it seems
likely that no better or more definite standard is possible. There
can be no standard for reversal except obviously outrageous excess
and naturally such excess is not often found.' 9' But a review of the
cases leaves one with the impression that the courts have pushed
337Horn v. Boise City Canal Co., 7 Idaho 64o, 65 Pac. 145 (igoi); Alabama
Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Flinn, i99 Ala. 177, 74 So. 246 (X917); Flinn v.
Fredrickson, 89 Neb. 563, 131 N. W. 934 (i911).
"'Osmun v. Winters, supra note 2; Chellis v. Chapman, supra note 6; Wilbur
v. Johnson, supra note 37; Perkins v. Hersey, supra note 81; Southard v. Rex-
ford, supra note 25.
''Olsen v. Solveson, 71 Wis. 663, 38 N. W. 329 (1888).
"'0Smillie v. Mendoza, supra note 83.
'$Goodall v. Thurman, supra note 6.
luaGiese v. Schultz, 69 Wis. 521, 34 N. W. 913 (1887); Liese v. Meyer, supra
note 37.
"'Such an indefinite rule may perhaps warrant illustration by a number of
concrete instances taken at random from the reports. In each case either all
the circumstances, or all that the court considered significant, are stated with
comments on the relevance of some of them.
A. American Cases: (i) Engagement lasted five months, plaintiff continued at
her vocation during that time, plaintiff after breach sold the engagement ring for
$275, two years later plaintiff married another man. At the trial plaintiff testified
that defendant always acted toward her as a perfect gentleman, that she lost no
other offer of marriage through the engagement, that her husband was a far
better man than defendant, and that her present home life was happy. De-
fendant testified that he had no property. Held that a verdict for $xo,ooo com-
pensatory, and $5,ooo punitive damages should be reduced to $4,ooo. Ableman
v. Holman, supra note 16. Several of the circumstances considered by the court
seem of doubtful admissability.
(2) Verdict for $iS,ooo. New trial granted for newly discovered evidence.
On the second trial it appeared that defendant was worth from $4o,ooo to $ioo,ooo
and had an annual income of $7,500. Verdict for $2o,ooo reduced by the lower
court to $6,5oo. Held that the latter sum was not excessive. Papanasopoulos v.
Zissis, 234 Mich. 195,207 N. W. 807 (1926). The case seems wrong in considering
the amount of the previous verdict at a trial where some of defendant's present
evidence was not before the court.
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the difficulty of finding excess too far." It may be that a reaction
(3) The promise of marriage denied and plaintiff's character for chastity at-
tacked in the defence of the case. Held $7,500 is not an excessive verdict. Smillie
v. Mendoza, supra note 83.
(4) The engagement lasted only twenty-nine days. Held a verdict for $3,ooo is
excessive. Densmore v. Thurston, supra note 112.
(5) Seduction appeared, both parties were laborers, and defendant had no
property. Held a verdict of $I,5OO compensatory, and $5oo punitive damages is
not excessive. Luther v. Shaw, supra note 6.
(6) Seduction was not alleged but defendant's evidence implied it had oc-
curred. Plaintiff denied it. Defendant was a working man whose only property
was a house not wholly paid for. Verdict for $25,ooo reduced to $12,500. Broy-
bill v. Norton, supra note 4.
(7) Defendant had property to the value of $5o,ooo to $60,000. Held a verdict
of $5,310 is not excessive. Smith v. Hall, supra note 4.
(8) Seduction, the birth of a child, and an attack on plaintiff's character for
chastity in defendant's answer. Held a verdict for $Io,ooo is not excessive.
Liese v. Meyer, supra note 37.
(9) Two previous verdicts, one of $1,o5o, the other of $3,5oo, had been re-
versed because of the inclusion of inadmissible elements of damage. Seduction
appeared. Verdict for $2,144- Much larger verdicts had been given in this
class of cases. Held the verdict was not excessive. Giese v. Schultz, supra note
192. This seems even worse than (2) supra.
(io) Seduction appeared. Held $2,ooo is not excessive damages. Haymond v.
Saucer, supra note 3.
(ii) Seduction and pregnancy appeared. No evidence of wealth was offered.
Held a verdict of $2,000 is not excessive. Wilbur v. Johnson, supra note 37.
(12) Defendant was worth $25,ooo. Held a verdict for $3,6o0 was not ex-
cessive. Douglas v. Gausman, supra note 83.
B. English cases: (i) Defendant seduced plaintiff, kept her for a long period,
took her abroad under pretence of marriage there, finally discarded her to marry
another, and at the trial attacked her character for chastity. Defendant had
considerable property, large expectations, and great superiority of social position
over the plaintiff. Held a verdict for £2,5oo was not excessive. Berry v. Da
Costa, supra note 22. This seems wrong in considering defendant's expectations
of property. Cf. (3), infra.
(2) Plaintiff was a clergyman's daughter and defendant was the son and assist-
ant of a silversmith. No imputations were made against plaintiff's character.
Verdict for £Xi5o which it did not appear that defendant could not pay. Hd the
verdict was not excessive. Gough v. Farr, I Y. & J. 477 (1827).
(3) Defendant, a woman "was worth £3ooo when plaintiff courted her and
afterwards £6ooo by the death of her brother." Held a verdict for £400 was not
excessive. Harrison v. Cage, supra note 83. This seems possibly to be subject
to the same criticism as (I), supra.
"It seems as if many of the courts were tacitly acting on the rule laid down by
Mansfield, C. J., in Hewlett v. Cruchley, 5 Taunt. 277, 282 (1813), for all cases
involving mental anguish. "Could anyone say," says the learned judge, "that
any rational man of character would for 2000 1. put himself in this situation?
If not, the damages are not excessive." This is a standard calculated to prevent
reversal in well nigh every case.
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I
has set in, however, as all the cases found of reversal and reduction.
for excess fall within the last thirty years.105 The rule of the sound
discretion of the jury also prevents reversal for inadequacy of dam-
ages when the verdict does not indicate undue motives on the jury's
part.1se
195Ableman v. Holman, supra note x6; Papanasopoulos v. Zissis, supra note 193;
Densmore v. Thurston, supra note i2; Broyhill v. Norton, supra note 4. For
details of these cases see note 193, supra. Another modem tendency not as desir-
able as this is toward a practice of considering verdicts in other cases (Giese v.
Schultz, supra note 192) or previous verdicts in the same case (Papanasopoulos
v. Zissis, supra note 193) as standards for comparison as to excess. This seems
improper since every case in breach of promise is extremely individual in its
facts. And see further comment on this practice in note 193, supra.
1
"Hooker v. Philippe, 26 Ind. App. 501, 6o N. E. 167 (1901). (Verdict for
damages of one cent sustained.)
It may have been noted that a tacit assumption has been made throughout,
by the use of the feminine personal pronoun and otherwise, that the woman
was the party plaintiff. This practice of convenience is justified by the cases, for
damages recovered by the man are indeed rare. A list of the cases of such re-
covery found may be of interest:
i. Harrison v. Cage, supra note 83: £4oo compensatory damages,
2. Leeds v. Cook, supra note 128: One shilling compensatory damages.
3. Baddeley v. Mortlock, supra note i59: One shilling compensatory damages.
4. Smit v. Jacobs, supra note 133: £ioo punitive damages.
